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Political Litigation and 
the Role of the Court 
Grant Huscroft* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fear of “politicizing the court” has always been the primary argument 
against reforming the judicial appointment process, and in particular the 
process of appointing the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. As 
arguments opposing change go, it is a good one: no one favours 
politicization. On the contrary, everyone is sure that politicization would 
be a bad thing, and that we should do all that we can to avoid it. 
The trouble is that “politicization” has no inherent meaning, and no 
definition is usually proffered. Courts engaged in the business of 
constitutional judicial review are necessarily engaged in politics, and the 
highest courts are the most political of all: not only do their decisions 
inform the political agenda for the elected branch of government, they 
shape the constitutional order itself. 
In this paper I want to discuss two recent decisions involving highly 
important and highly politicized issues. In Reference re Same-Sex 
Marriage1 the Court had no choice but to hear a reference from the 
federal government, but it decided not to decide whether limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples was constitutional, the only serious 
question in dispute. Conversely, in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General),2 the Court chose to hear the appeal, only to fail to reach a 
majority decision on the constitutionality of Quebec’s health care 
legislation. Both cases are revealing of the way in which the Court 
perceives its role — in particular its relationship with the executive and 
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legislative branches of government, and thus its place in the 
constitutional order. 
1. The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage 
The Marriage Reference is one of the most nakedly political cases in 
which the Court has been involved,3 and the way in which the Court 
handled the reference is more important than most commentators have 
noted.4 
I have outlined the background to this reference in another context, 
so will provide only a brief summary here.5 The federal government 
defended the common law definition limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples when challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms6 were brought by same-sex couples seeking marriage licences 
in several provinces. This position was in accordance with the wishes of 
Parliament, which in 1999 reaffirmed its commitment to the traditional 
definition of marriage.7 Courts in Quebec and British Columbia held 
that the traditional definition of marriage infringed the equality 
guarantee in the Charter, but those courts suspended their declarations 
of unconstitutionality in order to allow Parliament to address the 
situation.8 A committee of Parliament was considering the matter, and 
had held hearings across the country. 
                                                                                                            
3
 In rejecting the argument that the reference questions were not justiciable, the Court noted, 
id., at para. 11 that: “The political underpinnings of the instant reference are indisputable”, but added 
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The government might well have anticipated that it would lose in 
pending litigation in the Ontario Court of Appeal, but I doubt that it 
anticipated that Court’s decision in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney 
General)9 to give its declaration of unconstitutionality immediate effect. 
The practice of suspending controversial Charter rulings had become 
more generous than the Supreme Court’s decision in Schachter v. 
Canada10 contemplated, and the government had every reason to believe 
that this practice would be followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, in 
line with the decisions of courts in other provinces. Halpern changed the 
dynamic considerably, both legally and politically. 
Marriages began to take place immediately following that Court’s 
decision, thus creating a new status quo. The government announced 
that it would not be appealing the decision in Halpern; instead, it would 
be introducing legislation to change the definition of marriage, thus 
extending the result in Halpern across the country. First, however, the 
government would be referring its proposed legislation to the Supreme 
Court of Canada for its advice. 
(a) Three Reference Questions 
The government’s reference raised three questions: 
1. Is the proposed legislation within the exclusive legislative authority 
of Parliament? 
2. Is same-sex marriage consistent with the Charter? 
3. Are religious officials protected from compulsion to perform same-
sex marriage by the freedom of religion guarantee? 
It is important to emphasize that none of these questions was 
seriously in dispute.11 The government knew that Parliament possessed 
exclusive legislative authority in regard to marriage capacity; the parties 
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to the litigation conceded as much.12 The government knew that 
permitting same-sex marriage was consistent with the Charter; the 
litigation had concerned the question whether precluding same-sex 
marriage was consistent with the Charter. The third question had not 
arisen in the marriage litigation. It was included in the reference in the 
expectation that the Court would provide an affirmative answer, and so 
assuage fears about the impact of the proposed change in the law. In 
sum, no one doubted that Parliament could legislate a new definition of 
marriage if it chose to do so. The decision to refer these questions to the 
Supreme Court of Canada was designed to delay Parliament from 
dealing with the legislation, thus taking the issue off the political table 
in the short run. The only meaningful question was whether or not the 
traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage infringed the Charter, but 
the government did not refer this question, and in fact did all that it 
could to preclude this question from being answered by the Supreme 
Court. Not only did it not appeal the decision in Halpern, it insisted that 
no other group should be granted standing to do so.13 
(b) Adding a Fourth Question 
The retirement of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the assumption of 
leadership by Prime Minister Paul Martin saw the appointment of a new 
Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, and a revision of the government’s 
strategy. Before the case could be argued, the government added a 
fourth question to the reference, this one raising the very question that 
appeared to have died with the government’s decision not to appeal the 
decision in Halpern. Specifically, the government asked whether the 
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 Justice Pitfield in the B.C. Supreme Court appears to have been the only one to think 
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 [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 337. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Political Litigation and the Role of the Court 39 
traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage is consistent with the 
Charter. The addition of this question allowed opponents of same-sex 
marriage to have the “day in court” they sought but further delayed the 
Court in dealing with the reference, thus buying the government 
additional time in which to hold an election without Parliament having 
to debate the proposed legislation. 
The government’s performance was disingenuous, to say the least. It 
pretended that same-sex marriage was a judicial issue even as it 
proposed to legislate, and attempted to rely on the reference proceedings 
for political cover. At the same time, the government did all that it could 
to ensure that it received the answer it wanted on the fourth question. It 
conceded the unconstitutionality of the traditional definition of marriage 
in litigation in other provinces and territories that continued while the 
reference was pending. The lower courts obliged with declarations of 
unconstitutionality, and by the time the Supreme Court decided the 
reference case courts in seven provinces and territories had declared that 
the traditional definition of marriage was unconstitutional. Thousands of 
same-sex couples had been married as a result. The government had, 
through its litigation strategy, established a new status quo that the 
Court was unlikely to disturb, even if it were dubious about the 
unconstitutionality of the traditional definition of marriage.14 
(c) The Court’s Advice 
When I discussed this situation in 2004, I argued that the Court should 
repudiate the government’s political strategy, and I think that is in 
essence what the Court’s decision in the Marriage Reference did. But 
the Court’s repudiation was implicit rather than explicit: it repudiated 
the government’s political strategy by refusing to answer the fourth 
question in the reference. Although on the face of things this may seem 
an apolitical decision, in fact it is political from top to bottom. 
In order to refuse to answer the fourth question, the Court first had 
to establish that it had the power to refuse. It had to establish, in other 
words, that it is entitled to decide whether or not it will answer 
particular reference questions. The problem here is that nothing in the 
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language of the reference power in the Supreme Court Act supports this 
position. The relevant provision is section 53: 
Referring certain questions for opinion 
 53(1) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing 
and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning 
(a) the interpretation of the Constitution Acts; 
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or 
provincial legislation; 
(c) the appellate jurisdiction respecting educational matters, by 
the Constitution Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law vested 
in the Governor in Council; or 
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures 
of the provinces, or of the respective governments thereof, 
whether or not the particular power in question has been or is 
proposed to be exercised. 
Other questions 
 (2) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing 
and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning any 
matter, whether or not in the opinion of the Court esjudem generis 
with the enumerations contained in subsection (1), with reference to 
which the Governor in Council sees fit to submit any such question. 
Questions deemed important 
 (3) Any question concerning any of the matters mentioned in 
subsections (1) and (2), and referred to the Court by the Governor in 
Council, shall be conclusively deemed to be an important question. 
Opinion of Court 
 (4) Where a reference is made to the Court under subsection (1) or 
(2), it is the duty of the Court to hear and consider it and to answer 
each question so referred, and the Court shall certify to the Governor 
in Council, for his information, its opinion on each question, with the 
reasons for each answer, and the opinion shall be pronounced in like 
manner as in the case of a judgment on an appeal to the Court, and 
any judges who differ from the opinion of the majority shall in like 
manner certify their opinions and their reasons. ...15 
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As McEvoy puts it: “[t]he will of Parliament is manifestly clear … 
No margin of appreciation or discretion is conferred on the Court by its 
organic document, the Supreme Court Act, to refuse to answer a 
reference question.”16 Indeed, both the language of the reference power 
and its purpose suggest the opposite of any sort of judicial discretion. 
The Court has no role in determining the appropriateness of a question; 
that is the province of the government. Although the power to refer 
questions is styled as a discretion to refer “important questions of law or 
fact”, it is for the government to determine the importance of a matter, 
and there is a conclusive presumption that questions in accordance with 
subsection (1) or (2) are important questions. Subsection (4) makes the 
Court’s obligation clear: it is duty-bound to hear and consider reference 
questions and must provide opinions with reasons in regard to each such 
question.17 
How does the Court deal with this problem? In short, it does not 
deal with it at all. It simply ignores its statutory duty. The Court’s 
reasons for refusing to answer the fourth question are essentially 
pragmatic, policy-based considerations rather than legal justification. 
The Court begins by begging the question as to its authority on a 
reference question:  
The first issue is whether this Court should answer the fourth question, 
in the unique circumstances of this reference. This issue must be 
approached on the basis that the answer to Question 4 may be positive 
or negative; the preliminary analysis of the discretion not to answer a 
reference question cannot be predicated on a presumed outcome. The 
reference jurisdiction vested in this Court by s. 53 of the Supreme 
Court Act is broad and has been interpreted liberally: see, e.g., 
Secession Reference, supra. The Court has rarely exercised its 
discretion not to answer a reference question reflecting its perception 
of the seriousness of its advisory role.18 
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 McEvoy, “Refusing to Answer”, supra, note 4, at 38. 
17
 Peter Hogg has acknowledged that the Supreme Court Act and the counterpart provincial 
reference legislation “impose on the Court a duty to answer reference questions”. Nevertheless, he 
does not challenge the Court’s asserted discretion not to answer. On the contrary, he expresses the 
view that “the Court has not made sufficient use of its discretion not to answer a question posed on 
a reference” (Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997, 
updated in looseleaf) c. 8.6(d)) [Hogg, Constitutional Law]. 
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Citation of the Secession Reference19 to establish the breadth and 
liberal interpretation of the reference power is ironic. That was a case in 
which the Court answered far more than it was asked, and essentially 
presents the opposite problem: what is it that allows the Court to 
supplement the questions it is asked pursuant to the reference 
procedure?20 
The suggestion that the Court has rarely exercised the discretion it 
claims for itself is said to reflect the Court’s perception “of the 
seriousness of its advisory role” rather than compliance with its 
statutory duty. Plainly, the Court regards the performance of its advisory 
role as a matter of its own prerogative as opposed to a statutory duty. 
But the precedents the Court cites for refusing to answer reference 
questions concern cases in which sufficient legal content was lacking, or 
in which there were deficiencies in the question posed (ambiguity or 
lack of precision) or inadequacies in the record. Arguably these are not 
matters that give rise to a discretion at all; they are circumstances that in 
effect preclude the Court from performing its statutory duty. That is, 
they allow the Court to say: “we cannot answer the question posed”, 
rather than “we refuse”. 
The Court acknowledges the inaptness of the precedents to the 
context of the Marriage Reference. This was not a case involving a 
problematic question or an inadequate record. Nevertheless, the Court 
asserts that the categories highlighted important considerations, but are 
“not exhaustive”. According to the Court, the circumstances of the 
Marriage Reference were unique, “the combined effect of which 
persuades the Court that it would be unwise and inappropriate to answer 
the question.”21 
What were those circumstances? First, the Court noted the 
government’s stated position that it would be proceeding to introduce 
legislation regardless of the answer to the fourth question. According to 
the Court, it followed that an opinion from the Court “serves no legal 
purpose”.22 This would be a telling point if the Court had the discretion 
it asserts, but the Court never establishes that it has the discretion it 
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 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
20
 Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 is a famous 
example of the Court not only asking and answering its own questions, but doing so in the context 
of political conventions, which are legally unenforceable. 
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 Marriage Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 64. 
22
 Id., at para. 65. 
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exercises so it is simply irrelevant. The government was acting 
disingenuously in pressing an unnecessary reference question, but that is 
its statutory right. It is entitled to ask questions regardless of its 
motivation for doing so, and the Court is duty-bound to answer.23 
Even on its own, however, the Court’s position is problematic. The 
concession it wrested from counsel during the oral argument — that the 
government would be legislating regardless of the Court’s advice on the 
fourth question — should have been irrelevant, since the Crown cannot 
bind Parliament. The Crown is a supplicant for legislation: it introduces 
bills, but cannot guarantee that Parliament will pass them. We may be 
used to conflating “Parliament” and “government”, but even in the 
context of a majority government it is not for the Court to assume that 
the government can legislate at will. In any case, by the time the matter 
was decided by the Court, the government was in a minority position. It 
could not, in theory or in practice, ensure that Parliament would pass 
same-sex marriage or any other legislation. 
The Court then pursued a second objection, noting that rights had, in 
effect, vested on the refusal of the government to appeal the decision in 
previous litigation and its subsequent concessions in the other courts:  
The parties in EGALE, Halpern and Hendricks have made this 
intensely personal decision [to marry]. They have done so relying 
upon the finality of the judgments concerning them. We are told that 
thousands of couples have now followed suit. There is no compelling 
basis for jeopardizing acquired rights, which would be a potential 
outcome of answering Question 4.24 
This concern was predictable;25 yet the Court’s view about the 
undesirability of jeopardizing acquired rights is legally irrelevant since 
Parliament has the ability to legislate retroactively, and may unwind 
vested rights if it so chooses.26 If those rights were acquired improperly 
in the first place, based on an erroneous interpretation of the Charter in 
which the government acquiesced, why should it matter to the Court 
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 This is another good reason why the reference power is problematic, quite apart from 
the traditional reasons proffered by courts for refusing to perform advisory functions in 
jurisdictions like the United States — but this is a topic for another occasion. 
24
 Id., at para. 67.  
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 Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”, supra, note 5, at 262-63. 
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whether they would be jeopardized? The vesting of rights is something 
that Parliament is properly expected to take into account in deciding 
whether, and how, to legislate, but it is no legitimate concern of the 
Court, even assuming that the Court has a discretionary power to refuse 
to answer reference questions. 
In effect, the Court’s refusal to answer entrenches the results of the 
government’s litigation strategy in the lower courts. By refusing to 
appeal Halpern and conceding unconstitutionality in the other provincial 
courts, the government achieved a change in the law without legislating. 
This would be recognized as a more pressing concern if the government 
had changed hands rather than leaders; it is difficult to see how it is 
legitimate for a successor government to be bound by the decisions of 
its predecessor in this way, since the possibilities for abuse are so 
great.27 In any event, the fourth question was germane to legislation that 
would soon be debated in Parliament. The litigation decisions that 
vested the rights of the couples who married were made by the Crown; 
they did not bind Parliament. 
The Court supplements its argument for refusing to answer by 
noting that there is no precedent for answering a reference question in 
circumstances where an appeal route has not been pursued. Here again, 
however, this should be irrelevant: questions were referred to the Court 
pursuant to an exercise of statutory power by the government. The 
government has the discretion to use the reference procedure, and is 
under no obligation to act in accordance with precedent in doing so. 
The final point raised by the Court concerns the lack of efficacy of 
the reference procedure, given the government’s intention of achieving 
uniformity in regard to civil marriage across the country. According to 
the Court, answering the fourth question had the potential to undermine 
the uniformity the government’s proposed legislation would establish. 
The uniformity argument succeeds only if the answer to Question 4 is 
“no”. By contrast, a “yes” answer would throw the law into confusion. 
The decisions of the lower courts in the matters giving rise to this 
reference are binding in their respective provinces. They would be cast 
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 For example, a government could vest the rights of claimants whose cause it supports by 
purporting to concede unconstitutionality at any stage of litigation, and could do so in the 
knowledge that it is likely to lose the next election. The notion that the successor government 
should be disadvantaged by such a concession is deeply problematic, in my view, and a reason why 
concessions of unconstitutionality should normally be inappropriate, especially in the context of 
Charter challenges to legislation. See Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney-General and Charter 
Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator” (1995) 5 N.J.C.L. 125. 
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into doubt by an advisory opinion which expressed a contrary view, 
even though it could not overturn them. The result would be 
confusion, not uniformity.28 
The problem here is that any confusion that a “yes” answer to 
question four would engender would be the government’s responsibility 
to address. It is not for the Court to attempt to stave off political 
controversy for the government — especially when the government has 
engendered that controversy — and it is not obvious how a refusal to 
answer the fourth question avoids political confusion in any event. The 
government’s decision to legislate was tied to the assumed correctness 
of the lower court decisions — the notion that the Charter required a 
change in the definition of marriage. The Supreme Court’s decision to 
refuse to answer the fourth question created confusion of a different 
sort, by leaving open the possibility that the traditional definition of 
marriage was constitutional after all.29 
It is telling that the Court’s exercise of its purported discretion met 
with neither resistance nor even criticism from the government. After 
all, the government had insisted that the reference was required in order 
to inform the debate that was to occur in Parliament. For its part, the 
academic community was largely complimentary of the decision, 
praising it as though it were an act of statesmanship.30 
At the end of the day, however, it has to be asked whether refusing 
to answer the fourth question was the right thing to do, even assuming 
that the Court has the discretionary power it asserts.31 From the Court’s 
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 Marriage Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 70. 
29
 As McEvoy notes, the circumstances that persuade the Court not to answer the fourth 
question are all premised on the constitutionality of the traditional definition of marriage. McEvoy, 
“Refusing to Answer”, supra, note 4, at 32. 
30
 Dean Patrick Monahan of Osgoode Hall Law School described the Court’s decision as 
“a beautifully crafted judgment”: John Ibbitson, “Same-Sex Ruling: Here’s the Bottom Line: The 
System Works” The Globe and Mail (10 December 2004) A8. Ibbitson paraphrases Jennifer 
Koshan from the University of Calgary Faculty of Law as saying that the Court’s judgment 
defended and upheld the Constitution, proving that the system works. Kirk Makin’s story in The 
Globe and Mail also praised the decision: “Same-Sex Ruling: Analysis: Deft court crafts elegant 
opinion” (10 December 2004) A7, quoting Professors Bruce Ryder and Alan Hutchinson of 
Osgoode Hall Law School, and Professor Errol Mendes of the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law 
(Common Law). 
31
 I emphasize the notion that the Court refused to answer because it is unlikely that the 
various members of the Court refused to consider the question — that they did not even turn their 
minds to it in light of their decision to refuse to provide an answer. I have no doubt that the 
individual members of the Court considered the question, which makes the refusal to answer all the 
more troubling. 
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perspective there are only two possibilities: either the lower courts were 
right in concluding that the traditional definition of marriage infringed 
the Charter or they were wrong. If the Supreme Court thought that they 
were right, what possible harm would there have been in saying so?32 If, 
on the other hand, the Supreme Court thought that the lower courts were 
wrong — if it thought that the traditional definition of marriage did not 
infringe the Charter — different considerations would have arisen. If the 
lower courts were wrong, the consequence of the Court’s refusal to 
answer the fourth question was to leave unchallenged a series of 
erroneous decisions.33 That would be bad enough in terms of the 
precedential value those decisions might come to have, but the impact of 
the lower court decisions went well beyond their precedential value: 
they informed a series of political decisions that had been made, and 
would inform the votes that were to be held in Parliament. A decision 
that the traditional definition of marriage did not infringe the Charter 
would undoubtedly have caused some Members of Parliament to change 
their minds, and the outcome of the political process might have been 
different. No doubt, there would have been significant political upheaval 
in the short run, but nothing that could not have been managed in the 
ordinary political processes. 
Every decision of the Supreme Court that interprets the Constitution 
has political consequences — both intended and unintended — because 
every such decision creates incentives and disincentives for political 
action. It is impossible for the Court to act apolitically where the 
Constitution is concerned, and the Marriage Reference must be 
understood in this light. It is clear that the government sought to use the 
reference procedure and the Court for political purposes. It should be 
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 Irwin Cotler acknowledges only that the Court did not “directly” answer the fourth 
question. See Cotler, “Evolution or Revolution”, supra, note 14, at 63. He argues that the Court 
“affirm[ed] the constitutionality of the government’s approach” (at 63), but as I have said this was 
never in doubt. The only significant question was whether or not the traditional definition of 
marriage was inconsistent with the Charter, and the Court pointedly refused to answer. The Court 
did say this about the government’s proposal to legislate to change the law of marriage to include 
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equally clear that the Court used the reference to advance its own 
political purposes. The Court has sent the message that while the 
government can initiate the reference procedure, the Court defines the 
constitutional role it is willing to play, and performs its statutory 
advisory duty in accordance with that role. In short, the Court will 
decide whether, and to what extent, it will advise the government. 
Successive governments have acquiesced in the Court’s conception 
of its role in the reference procedure. The consequence is that, despite 
the terms of the Supreme Court Act, governments refer questions to the 
Court at their peril.34 
2. The Politics of Health Care  
In the past few years the shortcomings of the Canadian health care 
system have seemed glaring: soaring costs and extensive waiting lists 
are prominent problems. Senate reports, a Royal Commission, two 
federal and several provincial elections have propelled health care to the 
top of the list of political concerns. It was only a matter of time until the 
Supreme Court was asked to enter the fray, and it did so in Chaoulli. 
Chaoulli concerned the claim of Mr. Zeliotis, a patient in the public 
health system who had experienced a number of health problems, and 
Dr. Chaoulli, a physician who sought to operate outside the public 
system. They argued that Quebec legislation prohibiting the sale and 
purchase of private health insurance infringed section 7 of the Charter. 
They were unsuccessful at trial and in the Quebec Court of Appeal but 
prevailed in the Supreme Court of Canada, which allowed the appeal in 
a fractured 4:3 decision. Three judges held that the Quebec law 
infringed section 7 of the Charter and could not be justified under 
section 1; three judges held that there was no section 7 infringement; 
and one judge expressed no opinion on section 7, holding that the law 
infringed the Quebec Charter and that it was unnecessary to consider the 
Canadian Charter in the circumstances. 
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The decision in Chaoulli caught many by surprise, presumably 
because they supposed that medicare was sacred, and as a result 
essentially immune from judicial review. But Chaoulli is not the first 
case in which the Court has used its judicial review authority under the 
Charter to venture into “sacred” territory and it will not be the last: there 
are no categorical limits to the scope of judicial review under the 
Charter. There is no Charter right to health care per se, but the Court 
interprets the Charter as a “living tree” and may extend constitutional 
protection to additional rights from time to time.35 
I raise Chaoulli not to discuss the Court’s approach to section 7,36 
but instead to consider what the decision says about how the Court 
perceives its role in the constitutional order. Two questions come to 
mind. First, why did the Court agree to hear Chaoulli in the first place? 
Second, having decided to hear the case, why was the Court unable to 
reach a majority decision on the Charter question? 
(a) Why Did the Court Grant Leave to Appeal? 
No reasons are given when leave to appeal is granted, but they are not 
difficult to discern from the decisions in the case. The judges who 
granted leave all voted to overturn the impugned legislation,37 and their 
remarks in doing so are telling. 
Justice Deschamps’ decision makes clear that, in her view, 
government had been given more than enough time to solve the 
problems of delay in the health care system, and that it was time for the 
Court to take charge: 
The government had plenty of time to act. Numerous commissions 
have been established… and special or independent committees have 
published reports. … Governments have promised on numerous 
occasions to find a solution to the problem of waiting lists. Given the 
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tendency to focus the debate on a sociopolitical philosophy, it seems 
that governments have lost sight of the urgency of taking concrete 
action. The courts are therefore the last line of defence for citizens.38 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. reiterate the usual line taken 
by the Chief Justice in defending the Court against charges of judicial 
activism: the Court is the guardian of the Constitution; it cannot shirk its 
duty to hear claims that constitutional rights have been breached. They 
put the point this way: 
The fact that the matter is complex, contentious or laden with social 
values does not mean that the courts can abdicate the responsibility 
vested in them by our Constitution to review legislation for Charter 
compliance when citizens challenge it. As this Court has said on a 
number of occasions, “it is the high duty of this Court to insure that 
the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their constitutional 
mandate and engage in the illegal exercise of power”.39 
This overstates and oversimplifies things considerably, of course, 
since the notion of illegality suggests a black and white world where 
rights are concerned — legal and illegal legislation, easily recognized as 
such. The real contest in Charter cases is not between legislatures intent 
on denying rights and courts charged with protecting them, but instead 
between different conceptions of Charter rights — good faith 
disagreements about rights and reasonable limits.40 
In truth, the Court is selective in exercising its role as guardian of 
the Constitution. The Court controls its docket; it hears only the Charter 
cases it wants to hear based on the Court’s perception as to the 
importance of those cases.41 The Court might well have expected that it 
would have to enter the health care debate eventually, but why choose 
Chaoulli as the entry point? After all, Chaoulli was not a case in which 
the Court was required to resolve conflicts in Charter interpretation 
across the country. Charter challenges to the health care system were 
only beginning to make their way through the courts in most other 
provinces. Those courts were not bound by the Quebec Court of 
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Appeal’s decision in Chaoulli, and might well have expounded different 
understandings of section 7 in future litigation. Why not wait, then, for a 
body of law to develop in the other provinces? 
The argument for granting leave to appeal in Chaoulli would have 
been stronger had the outcome in the Quebec courts been different; it is 
difficult to allow a provincial appellate court to have the last word when 
it comes to making law based on the Charter. But the Charter challenge 
was unsuccessful in Quebec courts, and as a result the status quo in 
health care had not been altered. Putting the worst face on things, a 
decision to deny leave to appeal would have left standing a well-
established public health system that was the product of democratic 
processes, and was amenable to democratic reform. The decision of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal would have fallen into the range of cases with 
no definitive precedential value — neither approved by the Supreme 
Court nor overturned.  
In my view the prudent course would have been to deny leave to 
appeal in Chaoulli, thus allowing the issues to percolate across the 
country. That is, in fact, one of the chief benefits of a federal system: 
different provincial approaches to health care can be considered in 
different provincial courts. The Supreme Court could have allowed that 
process to unfold in the knowledge that eventually it would adjudicate a 
better-informed case. In the meantime, ongoing political processes 
would have continued. On the best-case scenario, political reform might 
have ameliorated some of the problems in health care, perhaps obviating 
the need for Charter litigation. The cost of denying leave to appeal in 
Chaoulli was, at worst, a delay before the Court would enter the fray. 
(b) Why Was the Court Unable to Reach a Majority Decision on the 
Charter Question?  
Having decided to hear the case, the Court took a full year to render its 
decision but was unable to reach a majority decision on the alleged 
breach of the Charter. What are we to make of this? 
Plainly, the Court was in a difficult position. The resignations of 
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. meant that it was operating at less than full 
strength. A narrow majority one way or the other on something as 
important as health care might well have done more harm than good. 
For all of the bluster about the Court’s special role as guardian of the 
Constitution, that role is difficult to justify when decisions on 
constitutionality hinge on a single vote: if the constitutional issues are so 
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finely balanced, why should the decision of a bare majority of justices 
be preferred to that of the elected branch of government?42 Beyond this, 
however, loomed a more practical consideration: with two vacancies to 
be filled, it was always possible that a 4:3 ruling might not be supported 
by the Court when it reached full strength. That would be embarrassing 
for the Court, to say the very least, and was no doubt something the 
Court wished to avoid. 
Now, there is no obligation for the Court to hold open even the most 
controversial issues simply because it is not at full strength; the Court 
has made law in a number of Charter cases with less than full-strength 
benches.43 But there is no doubt that the Court prefers to deal with 
important matters with a full bench and, what is more, with strong 
majority judgments — better still, unanimity — whenever possible. 
That was not to be in Chaoulli, however; the Court was divided on 
the principles of fundamental justice, a division inspired by different 
conceptions as to the respective roles of the legislature and the courts. 
This is the context in which Deschamps J. refused to cast the 
deciding vote on the Canadian Charter argument. She chose to decide 
the case exclusively under the Quebec Charter, and her reasons for 
doing so are far from convincing. The Court’s decision to grant leave 
signalled that it was a case of national importance, and the involvement 
of so many provincial and national bodies as interveners underscored 
this point. The case had been argued as a violation of the Canadian 
Charter from the outset, and dealt with by the lower courts on that basis. 
Even assuming the logical priority of the Quebec Charter, refusing to 
say anything on what had always been regarded as the central issue in 
the case is incongruous — especially in the face of McLachlin C.J.’s 
insistence that courts could not “abdicate the responsibility vested in 
them by our Constitution to review legislation for Charter compliance 
when citizens challenge it”.44 The best that can be said of Deschamps 
J.’s non-decision is that it precluded the Court from reaching a majority 
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decision on the Charter, leaving section 7 to be argued another day 
before a full court in different circumstances.45 
Still, the political landscape has been altered by the Court’s 
decision; politicians are on notice that the Court may intervene in the 
health care debate, and the outcome of that intervention is uncertain. 
Chaoulli creates both incentives and disincentives for political reform, 
and these must be taken into account even where there is room for 
ordinary legislation. 
The difficulties in legislating — let alone invoking the 
notwithstanding clause — are usually understated by proponents of 
dialogue theory, and as a result I have argued that the Court should be 
more reticent to decide constitutional issues than it is.46 The Court 
should, in other words, take responsibility for keeping judicial review in 
check, lest it become the dominant feature of our constitutional order. 
The Court has, however, often expressed the contrary view: judicial 
review is said to be necessary because politicians cannot be counted on. 
The point is neatly captured in Lamer C.J.’s candid interview with the 
press, in which he exclaimed:  
Thank God we’re here. It’s not for me to criticize legislators but if 
they choose not to legislate, that’s their doing. If they prefer to leave it 
up to the court that’s their choice. But a problem is not going to go 
away because legislators aren’t dealing with it. People say we’re 
activist, but we’re doing our job.47  
Supporters of dialogue theory have, for the most part, lauded the 
Court for its courage in addressing Charter issues in controversial 
circumstances.48 Prior to Chaoulli, Kent Roach expressed the view that 
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techniques designed to avoid ruling on questions of constitutionality — 
Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues”49 and Cass Sunstein’s “judicial 
minimalism”50 — are irrelevant in the Canadian context, and that their 
use is tantamount to a dereliction of the Court’s duty.51 Chaoulli has 
prompted him to qualify his opposition, however, at least in regard to 
section 7 cases. He regards the Court’s approach to section 7 of the 
Charter as erroneous,52 and argues that the Court has essentially read 
section 1 out of section 7 — it has precluded the ability of governments 
to justify an infringement of section 7 in all but emergency situations, 
and so compromised the ability to engage in the dialogue he advocates.53 
I do not share Roach’s concern in regard to the interpretation of 
section 7. It has always been more difficult to justify limits on some 
rights than others, and the case for judicial modesty in constitutional 
interpretation is strong quite apart from cases involving rights that are 
subject to definitional balancing. I am afraid that much of the criticism 
of the decision in Chaoulli stems not from principled concerns about the 
scope of judicial review, but instead from having one’s ox gored.54 
Many of the strongest proponents of judicial review abhor private health 
care and are deeply disturbed by the result in Chaoulli. As a result, they 
are now in the unfamiliar position of counselling judicial restraint.55 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s rhetoric in defending the Court against 
critics of “judicial activism” precludes her from taking a more modest 
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position in Chaoulli. Her only concession to the political nature of the 
case is the understated acknowledgment that the health care issue “may 
have policy ramifications”.56 Even Binnie and LeBel JJ., who 
acknowledge that “a correct balance must be struck between the 
judiciary and the other branches of government”, and that “[e]ach 
branch must respect the limits of its institutional role”,57 give short shrift 
to arguments about justiciability. They categorically reject the notion of 
a political questions doctrine, and accept that the appellants had a 
sufficient interest to be granted standing to bring the case. 
It is easy to deprecate constitutional avoidance mechanisms, but if 
their use is to be disavowed proponents of judicial review must take the 
bad with the good. Chief Justice Dickson’s admonition from R. v. 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd.58 — that in interpreting and applying the 
Charter “the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does not simply 
become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll back 
legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of 
less advantaged persons” — is of little use as an interpretive principle.59 
If, as Binnie and LeBel JJ. argue, the Court has blundered into health 
care and created a nebulous “reasonable care within a reasonable time” 
standard60 — then the only real check on the Court is its confidence in 
its institutional competence to decide future health care cases.  
The signs from Chaoulli are disquieting. Justice Deschamps’ 
remarks in the context of assessing the level of deference required 
suggest overconfidence where caution is required. She acknowledges 
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the substantial differences of opinion when it comes to health care 
policy, but insists that “[t]he courts are an appropriate forum for a 
serious and complete debate”,61 and quotes the following claim with 
approval: 
[C]ourts do not have to define goals, choose means or come up with 
ideas. They do not have to create social policies; they just have to 
understand what the other branches have created. No special expertise 
is required for such an understanding.62 
I think that this seriously underestimates the nature of the task at 
hand, and at the same time overestimates judicial expertise. There are 
important questions here beyond institutional competence that go to 
democratic legitimacy, but they are largely ignored. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Marriage Reference and Chaoulli are the decisions of a Court that 
is self-defining of its role in constitutional litigation, and as a result its 
place in the constitutional order. The extent to which either decision will 
prompt debate about the role of the Court, and the impact that debate 
will have on the Court, remains to be seen. 
The Court cannot help but notice how politicized Charter litigation 
has become. One of the interesting developments in the Marriage 
Reference and Chaoulli concerns the involvement of politicians as 
interveners in Charter litigation. Two politicians were allowed to 
intervene in the Marriage Reference, a Senator and a Member of 
Parliament,63 and 10 Senators were granted intervener status in 
Chaoulli.64 The participation of politicians in Charter litigation confirms 
some of the worst fears about the impact of judicial review on the 
political process: some politicians may have decided that more can be 
accomplished through Charter litigation than through the democratic 
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political processes.65 This is not a sign of a healthy democratic 
constitutional order, and the Court would do well to reflect on this as it 
continues to define its constitutional role. 
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